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Abstract. This paper presents a theoretical account of legal validity. We begin with 
a very simple criterial account of validity and discuss the possibility of elimination 
of such concept by means of procedure described in Ross' paper Tû-Tû. Then we 
discuss more ambitious theoretical proposals concerning validity, advocated by 
Grabowski and Sartor. We make an attempt to reconcile and further generalize these 
accounts. Finally, we focus on the broadest view encompassing the role of 
institutions with regard to validity. The notion of intermediate anchoring institutions 
is key in the new social scenarios created through linked-data systems. Some 
examples are provided. 
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1. Introduction 
The notion of validity plays a crucial role not only in legal theory, but in AI and Law 
research, especially in Information Retrieval systems, modelling of legislation, expert 
systems and in Semantic Web research as well. But is validity actually a necessary 
concept in legal theory and in computational modelling of law? As we will show, not all 
relevant elements of the said concept are computable, and this leads to the idea of 
intermediate anchoring institutions to build hybrid regulatory models. In order to turn 
legal a regulatory system, a hybrid strategy in between human and computer interfaces 
is needed, assembling hard law, soft law, policies, and ethical principles. 
2. Is Validity Tû-tû? 
In 1957 Alf Ross published the English version of his famous paper “Tû-tû” where he 
discussed the semantics of intermediate legal concepts [1,2]. Meaning nothing, ‘Tû-Tû’ 
is in reverse order ‘Ut-Ut’, in Latin, a funny shadow effect for ‘So-that’, in English.  He 
observed that the application of such concepts (e.g. ownership – but the analysis is 
relevant for any term designing a legal status of a person or of a thing) is dictated by two 
sets of rules: input rules (determining the criteria of usage of a concept) and output rules 
(providing for the consequences of application of a concept). Let us present a set of such 
exemplary rules concerning ownership: 
Input Rule. If A bought a thing T, then A is an owner of T. 
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Output Rule. If A is an owner of T, then A may sell T. 
By means of the law of transitivity of implication (if A → B and B → C then A → 
C) we may eliminate the intermediary concept of ownership and form the set of rules by 
obtaining a rule which adopts a disjunction of antecedents of Input Rules as its antecedent 
and a conjunction of consequents of Output Rules as its consequent (Final Rule), 
provided that the intermediate concept in question always entails a conjunction of all its 
legal effects. Such concepts as ownership, concludes Ross, are in fact empty shells with 
no meaning at all. Their main role is enabling the legislator to make normative texts more 
concise. As a matter of course, the application of the law of logic is trivial and 
straightforward. A question arises whether a legal theorist is justified to apply this law 
to the effect of semantic reduction of intermediate concepts. 
Ross’ conception provoked a broad discussion in legal theory. As any strong thesis, 
it provoked criticism, but it also has a strong heuristic value, because it inspired 
development of new theoretical accounts of the role of legal concepts in inference [5] [6] 
[7] [8] [9]. In a recent paper Brożek [8] argues in particular that logical argument cannot 
suffice to establish Ross’ claim, because it leads to paradoxical results – any term of the 
language can be seen as semantically void.  
Does this critique mean that Ross’ reduction thesis is plainly wrong? We argue that 
only a subset of terms used in social reality is reducible in the sense of Ross. It is difficult 
to provide for a definitive set of criteria for determining whether a concept belongs to 
this class. Referring to the objections presented above, the following set of questions 
may be asked to assess an analyzed concept C: 
Q1. Are the sets of Input Rules and Output Rules exhaustive? 
Q2. Are all the Input Rules and Output Rules equally important? 
Q3. Was the concept C specifically crafted for the normative context in which it 
functions? 
Positive answers to the three questions provide a presumptive reason for claiming that C 
may be reducible in the sense of Ross, and that negative answers support a contrary 
conclusion. Taking the above analyses into consideration, let us try to answer a question 
whether the concept of legal validity is reducible in the sense described above. To give 
justice to Ross, let us stress that he would probably reject such possibility due to 
empirical (realistic) stance he adopted with regard to the most fundamental issues of legal 
theory. The notion of Rossian reduction has to a great extent detached from the legal-
philosophical background adopted by the author , due to the work of Sartor, Hage and 
Pfordten [10] and many others. Therefore it seems worthwhile to consider whether legal 
validity can be reduced to the Final Rule of the form described above.  Such reduction 
seems not to be adequate in case of the concept of validity, as it is actually used in legal 
reality. The criterial conception of validity is overly simplistic; even in legal cultures 
where positivism still dominates it is very difficult to provide an exhaustive list of 
sufficient and necessary criteria for validity of statutory norms – which entails a negative 
answer to Q1 above. Also, validity is not an artificial juristic concept with clear meaning, 
but on the contrary, it is present in juristic and also in general language and sometimes 
labeled as one of essentially contested concepts (negative answer to Q3).  
It follows, therefore, that even though it is possible to adopt such conception of 
validity which may be easily reduced to the Rossian sense, this conception itself is not 
descriptively adequate to fulfil its promises. The inferential dimension of validity [9] 
should not lead to the conclusion that it can be reduced by means of the Rossian method 
(although some legal concepts can). 
3. Post-positivistic Conception of Validity and Beyond 
During the recent years the most ambitious legal-theoretical project related to the 
very concept of validity was presented by Grabowski [7]. The author focuses on the legal 
notion of validity (as opposed to other types of validity, e.g. moral ones) and on validity 
of statutory law (as opposed to other types of law, e.g. case law). The conception is 
located in the philosophy of law referred to as post-positivism, where the concept of law 
is understood broadly — the law comes to being by means of discourse.  
Grabowski analyzed both intension (meaning) and extension (scope) of legally valid 
norms. As regards the former issue, he states that a norm of statutory law is valid if and 
only if the potential addressee of the norm does not have any legal possibility to refuse 
to behave in accordance with the norm or to undertake activities necessary to realize aims 
required by the norm . The extension of the notion “valid norm” is determined in a 
discourse concerning validity. In the discourse, certain criteria of validity are used, but 
they do not provide for a definition of validity, but rather for basis for a presumption of 
validity . The presumption of validity of a norm may be conveniently presented in a form 
of an argumentation scheme [11] which has not been done in earlier literature of the 
subject:.  
 
Argumentation scheme for validity of a legal norm (with critical questions). 
Premise 1. A norm N was made public in accordance with procedural conditions and 
it came into force. 
Premise 2. A norm D, made public in accordance with procedural conditions, 
derogating the norm N, has not came into force. 
Conclusion. The norm N is valid. 
 
Q0. Are the premises 1 and 2 actually presumptively sufficient for inferring a 
conclusion that N is valid (this is in fact a meta-question which attacks the structure of 
the argumentation scheme itself);. 
Q1. Was N actually made public in accordance with procedural conditions and did 
it actually came into force? (negative answer leads to rejection of conclusion). 
 Q1.1. Are there any strong reasons for admitting validity of N even though it 
was not made public in accordance with procedural conditions?  
Q2. Did the norm D, derogating the norm N, made public in accordance with 
procedural conditions, came into force? 
 Q2.1. Are there any strong reasons for admitting validity of N even though its 
derogating norm, D, was made public in accordance with procedural conditions and came 
into force?  
 Q2.2. Did the norm E, derogating the norm D, made public in accordance with 
procedural conditions, came into force?  
Q3. Are there any strong reasons for rejecting validity of N even though the answer 
to Q1 is positive and the answer to Q2 is negative?  
Q4. Are there any reasons for suspension of validity of N even though the answer to 
Q1 is positive and the answer to Q2 is negative?  
This account the conditions of validity cannot be easily reduced to any exhaustive 
set of criteria (and hence a complete set of Input Rules).2 On the other hand, it enables 
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It is worthwhile to compare Grabowski’s postpositivistic conception of validity with 
Sartor’s inferential view of this concept [9]. Sartor takes the inferential character of the 
notion of validity for granted, but he explicitly refuses the possibility of elimination of 
validity from the legal conceptual scheme. He proposes that satisfaction of certain 
conditions by a norm leads to a conclusion of its validity, and validity of a norm strictly 
implies its bindingness, which means that this norm should be endorsed and applied in 
reasoning of legal decision-makers. This leads to a conclusion that binding norms in the 
sense of Sartor are not necessarily valid norms in the sense of Grabowski, because in the 
latter ones the pattern of behavior has to be relatively fixed to make an answer possible 
to the question concerning possibility of refusal to comply with the norm or not. 
Nevertheless, we can see a pathway towards the reconciliation of the two conceptions. 
Araszkiewicz [12] argues that the dispute between legal defeasibilism and 
indefeasibilism may be solved by adoption of a set of rules translating one of these 
conceptual schemes into another.  
Having said that, let us now adopt a conception according to which law is a system 
of different types of information which may be used as premises and conclusions in 
argumentation and in the decision-making processes (whose scope is set out by the 
criteria specified inside of this argumentative net). We may, therefore, propose for a scale 
of such premises from the most formally binding ones to purely persuasive ones, 
beginning from the relatively complete statutory norms in the sense of Grabowski, but 
this issue concerns the content of what is valid and not validity itself), then defeasible 
statutory rules in the sense of Sartor, case law, rules based on official recommendations 
issues by authorities, soft law, legislative materials, regulatory policies and so on. Hence, 
we may propose for a broader conception of normative relevance.  
An object O is normatively relevant in legal system S if a legal subject P does not 
have legal ground not to take appropriate stance towards O. Let us add that the “legal 
ground” used in the proposed account is an open and context-sensitive concept which 
does not exclude that such ground may stem from the social practice and not necessarily 
from any authoritative act. 
4. The quest for intermediate  anchoring institutions  
Let’s take an empirical approach, now. Actually, Ross’s attempt to eliminate the 
unnecessary meaning of inferential intermediate concepts was not new when he 
formulated it. Warren McCulloch [13] had put it crudely: "biologists have exorcised 
ghosts from the body, whence they went to the head, like bats from the belfry". Tû-Tû, in 
fact was anticipated by Gregory Bateson in Naven (1936) [14]. Positive and negative 
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feed-backs were needed to understand the functional role of Naven among the Iatmul and 
in the end, its ‘meaning’, another bat from the belfry. 
This is a behavioural analogy for the intermediate legal concepts or “vehicles of 
inference” figured out by Ross (and Wedberg), and a bit later, Lindahl and Odelstadt, 
Sartor, and many others.  What we are suggesting here is that in the new scenarios 
emerging within the Web of data, we can extend the same idea using not only 
argumentation schemes but intermediate anchoring institutions. We will put aside in this 
paper the discussion about defining institutions as a social ontology (the searlian “x 
counts as y in a context z”). We are more interested now in showing that validity can be 
treated in fact  as a way of conveying the notion that a specific norm or a particular 
regulatory system have turned legal, i.e.  have acquired the property of being identified 
as binding, acceptable or compliable into a particular social context(i.e. in the particular 
ecosystem created by its regulatory patterns. In this way, the concept can be better 
understood as referring to a gradual continuum than as a discrete category.  It emerges 
from a complex social dynamics rather than supervene from an inferential chain [4].  
On the web, regulatory tools (including law) cannot be the same than before [16]. 
Using semantic languages to model rights (e.g. Digital Rights Management, Open Digital 
Rights Management, legal ontologies, Ontology Design Patterns…) changes the 
epistemic object itself, as these tools have to be accorded, harmonised, and anchored at 
different stages and levels of organisation in a human-machine interface. Yet, we don’t 
have a general framework to share all of them. E.g. to start with digital identity, the US 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) just launched an open call for 
comments (from August 1st to September 30th 2016) on a preliminary regulatory draft.3 
The metadata schema for attributes that may be asserted about an individual during an 
online transaction has not been settled either.  
The meaning of norms are often different to that originally intended, due to social, 
cultural, and technical changes [15]. We can provide some examples of the kind of 
intermediate institutions we are thinking of. The regulation of emergent transnational 
markets, and privacy, data protection, and security by design (PbD, DPbD, SbD) offer 
examples of the so-called “identity meta-system layer” of the Internet, whose legal status 
is still pending. At present, data and metadata are being regulated through an intertwined 
network of sources, including national and international statutes, Directives, 
Regulations, policies, standards, protocols, technical recommendations, and ethical and 
professional principles (e.g. the Fair Information Practices, FIPs, adopted by USA 
government at the federal level). In Europe, the situation is even more complex since the 
General Data Protection Reform (GDPR) recently came to an end. The new Directive 
and Data Protection Regulation contain a complete set of legal concepts —transparency, 
data minimisation, proportionality, among others. It is worth mentioning that they bring 
about a sustainable extension of rights that can be enforced through economic sanctions, 
and instruments of monitoring and control. Many researchers in this area have already 
pointed out that they cannot be completely hardcoded [17]]. This is the space in which 
legal anchoring institutions operate i.e., a situated (contextual), hybrid (human-machine), 
and semi-formal space that brings together all the elements that are required to build, 
control and monitoring regulatory systems encompassing hard law, soft law, governance 
and ethics. 
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5. Conclusions and future work  
From an inferential approach, if the rule x satisfies certain preconditions, then it is 
valid. Validity means ‘legal’. If the rule is legal, then it is obligatory (binding), which 
means that the inferential role of the concept of validity “consists exactly in the fact that 
establishing that a norm is legally valid licenses us (and indeed obliges us, if the norm is 
relevant) to use the norm in legal reasoning” [5].  
We have shown in this paper that this perspective could benefit from a more 
empirical approach, which is most needed in the present regulatory trends of the web of 
data.  The quality of “legal” has a discursive and argumentative component, but it is 
embedded into regulatory systems (or ‘legal reality’) which are broader and cannot be 
confused with the existence of norms. If validity emerges from the dynamics of different 
constituents and it is not only a normative property, several problems arise.  E.g. What 
kind of models and metamodels could be built to describe such regulatory systems? What 
kind of metrics could be used? Would it be possible to produce composite social 
indicators for these properties? How could we encompass normative validity with its 
empirical legal dimension?  How could we bridge ontological and non-ontological legal 
resources?  These are problems still to be solved.   
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